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Bilateral Investment Treaties 
By Eamon Macdonald 
 
|Preamble| 
| This paper, “Bilateral Investment Treaties: Liberal Tools Encouraging Greater 
Financial Direct Investment or Economic Nationalist Instruments?” will examine 
the legal arguments on how best to regulate Foreign Direct Investment, especially 
exploring the ramifications of the widespread use of Bilateral Investment Treaties 
(BTIs). | 
 
In November 1959, the Federal Republic of Germany and Pakistan signed a 
‘Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments’ with the stated 
intention of establishing ‘favourable conditions for investments by nationals 
and companies of either State in the territory of the other State’.1 Developed 
out of the Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaties which had become 
commonplace in the 19th century, this seminal treaty between Pakistan and 
the Federal Republic of Germany came to be known as the world’s first 
Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). The concept of the BIT is simple. Designed 
to establish and uphold the terms and conditions of Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI), BITs are supposed to ensure equitable and fair treatment of investors in 
a foreign country. One of the key ways in which BITs achieve this is through 
their distinctive use of international tribunals as dispute resolution 
mechanisms, which ensure that an investor does not have to sue a host 
company or state in its own courts. As such, BITs have always seemed to be 
fundamentally liberal documents which promote international trade with an 
emphasis on fairness for all parties. Proponents of BITs have even gone as far 
to argue that they ‘symbolise a commitment to economic liberalism’.2 
Sixty years on from the inaugural BIT between Pakistan and Germany, BITs have 
become a cornerstone of global trade with around 3,300 currently in existence, 
concerning virtually every country in the world.3 In short, BITs are the primary 
source of international investment law to protect and promote 
 
 
1 Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (with Protocol and exchange of notes), 
Germany and Pakistan, 25 November 1959, 457 U.N.T.S. 24 (entered into force 28 November 1962). 
2 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, “The Political Economy of a Bilateral Investment Treaty” The American 
Journal of International Law 92, no. 4 (October 1996), 628 
3 Julia Calvert, “Constructing Investor Rights? Why some states fail to terminate bilateral investment 
treaties” Review of International Political Economy 25, no. 1 (December 2017): 77. 
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cross-border investment flows.4 Despite their prominence in international 
trade, BITs are becoming an increasingly controversial tool. Recently, two 
major arguments have been used to cast aspersion on the value of BITs in 
today’s global economy. Firstly, moral criticisms have been levelled against 
BITs from those concerned about the amount of power such treaties afford to 
wealthy investors and the ways in which such investors can manipulate BITs 
to take advantage of less economically developed nations. Further to this, 
political organisations have begun to question the legitimacy of the 
international tribunals which BITs employ as arbitrators of disputes. In 2020, 
these concerns prompted the European Union to terminate all existing 
intraEU BITs. For some critics, BITs are much more ‘useful foreign policy 
tools’5 than treaties protecting capital invested overseas, and BITs have been 
seen as economic nationalist weapons. This essay seeks to explore the validity 
of the two central criticisms which have made the future of BITs seem so 
uncertain.  
It will be suggested that an analysis of two key rulings on BITs, Slovak Republic 
v Achmea (2018) and Phillip Morris v Uruguay (2016), illuminates the 
failures and dangers of BITs. Ultimately, it will be argued that whilst not all of 
the thousands of BITs which constitute FDI are dangerous, BITs afford 
excessive protection to investors and sometimes facilitate the bullying of 
developing nations by developed nations or multinational conglomerates. 
Proponents of BITs argue that the treaties offer vital substantive and 
procedural guarantees for investors, encouraging FDI without which today’s 
globalised economy would never have materialised. Signatories of BITs, for 
example, are obliged to ensure that foreign firms are treated in the same way 
as domestic firms in a process known as ‘national treatment’. Moreover, BITs 
offer genuine protection against expropriation, and massively reduce the 
frustrating protectionist measures often imposed by nations on foreign firms 
operating in their jurisdiction. One prime example of this is that, under BITs, 
governments are unable to force firms to use local materials in their products, 
and perhaps most importantly under a BIT foreign firms are able to freely 
 
4 Eric Neumayer, “Self Interest, Foreign Need, and Governance: Are Bilateral Investment Treaties 
Programs Similar to Aid Allocation” Foreign Policy Analysis 2, vol. 3 (July 2006): 251 
5 Adam Chilton, “Reconsidering the Motivations of the US Bilateral Investment Treaty Program” 
Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 108, no.1 (July 2014): 
374.  
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move capital in and out of the country in which they are investing without any 
limits or caps.  
Supporters suggest that BITs do not simply facilitate international trade and 
advance the liberal economic agenda in theory but point to the broader history 
of global economic growth as evidence of BITs practical and significant impact 
on world’s economy.6 Although BITs can trace their early developments to the 
late 1950s, they were not utilised as a major tool of international trade until 
the 1990s. Indeed, from 1959 to 1969 a mere seventy-four BITs were signed 
(this is around eight a year), with approximately half of these being concluded 
by Germany.7 In the 1970s, there was a significant increase of nations signing 
initial BITs, with the UK, US, France, and Japan developing their inaugural 
BITs in the mid-70s. Between 1977 and 1986 153 BITs were agreed, doubling 
the rate witnessed a decade prior.8 It was only in the 1990s, however, that BITs 
began to become the commonplace and mainstream international trade 
agreement that they are today. In 1996 alone 196 BITs were negotiated, more 
than in the entire sum of the previous decade and much more than the eight 
per year concluded in the 1960s.9 The rise of BITs in the 1990s prompted 
contemporary commentators to acknowledge the treaties as ‘one of the more 
remarkable developments of international law in the mid-1990s’. The 1990s 
not only witnessed the rise of the BIT, but also saw one of the most remarkable 
periods of economic growth in global history. Between 1991 and 2001 the US 
recorded its largest period of economic expansions ever, with 120 months of 
consecutive growth.10 Looking at the economy from a more global perspective, 
the 1990s saw the ratio of assets owned by foreign residents to world GDP rise 
from 48.6 per cent in 1990 and 92.0 per cent in 2000, which represents around 
5 times the peak reached earlier in the century.11 It is no coincidence that the 
sudden proliferation of the BIT occurred at the same time as extraordinary 
global economic growth and a dramatic increase in international investing. As 
 
6 Sabine Selchow, “The Globalisation Discourse and the New World,” in Negotiations of the New 
World, ed. Sabine Selchow (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), 69–95 
7 See Vandevelde, “The Political Economy of a Bilateral Investment Treaty”, 630. 
8 Ibid 
9 Ibid 
10 Nicholas Crafts, “The World Economy in the 1990s: a Long Run Perspective” (Working Paper 87/04, 
London School of Economics, 2004) 1. 
11 Ibid 
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the USSR and its satellite states collapsed and opened up their markets it was 
the BIT which enabled Western countries to trade with these formerly 
communist states: without the BIT’s insistence upon the use of international 
tribunals to resolve trade disputes, for example, it is difficult to imagine the US 
trading on a large scale with the Russian Federation out of fear of its allegedly 
corrupt legal system.  Ultimately, the BIT played an integral role in the rapid 
globalisation and growth of the 1990s and was heralded as the document 
which allowed liberal economic policies of free trade and globalisation to 
occur.     
More recently, however, this notion of the BIT as an intrinsically liberal tool 
has come under fire from liberalism’s fiercest defenders. The European Union 
is widely acknowledged as one of the world’s most dedicated supporters of 
liberal economic policy12, and yet in 2020 the EU took the radical step of 
banning intra-EU BITs.13 As previously mentioned, there are two mainstream 
arguments deployed by those who seek to see the decline of BITs. The first 
accusation is that Bilateral Investment Treaties frequently employ vague terms 
such as ‘fair and equitable treatment’, ‘indirect expropriation’, and ‘umbrella 
clause’, which are then exploited by wealthy investors to prevent less 
economically developed nations exercising regulatory control. This issue is 
exacerbated by BIT’s insistence on using arbitral tribunals which are biased 
towards investors and which often adopt fairly expansive interpretations of the 
aforementioned vague terms. This, suggests Richard Chen, contributes ‘to a 
jurisprudence skewed in favour of investors, as such arbitrators would 
naturally be more sympathetic to investor claims and have less appreciation 
for the regulatory needs of states’.14 
The ability for wealthy investors to use BITs as vehicles through which to 
intimidate smaller nations was perhaps most shockingly exposed when Philip 
Morris International (PMI)– a globally renowned cigarette manufacturer –
attempted to initiate litigation against Uruguay. In February 2010 the 
Uruguayan government introduced two new laws regulating the sale of tobacco 
 
12  Hubert Zimmerman, “Brexit and the External Trade Policy of the EU” European Review of 
International Studies 6, no. 1 (September 2019), 30. 
13 Julien Berger, International Investment Protection within Europe: The EU’s Assertion of Control  
(London: Routledge, 2020), 1.    
14 Bruce Love, “Battle Royal Over EU’s Bilateral Investment Treaties,” Financial Times, September 13, 
2019, 24.   
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due to public health concerns. First, the Uruguayan government banned the 
practice of selling one type of cigarette under multiple different packaging (a 
technique by cigarette companies designed to target a range of demographics), 
instead adopting the ‘Single Presentation Requirement’, whereby Article 3 of 
Ordinance NO.514, of the Constitution of the Republic, requires cigarette 
companies to sell only one unique presentation of each cigarette brand as of 
February 200915 Second, by Presidential decree, Uruguay forced tobacco 
companies to display graphic health warnings covering 80% of cigarette 
packaging. The response to this legislation from the health authorities was 
overwhelmingly positive and the legislation was widely considered to be a good 
faith policy aimed at improving the life expectancy of Uruguayans. Philip 
Morris International, however, was badly affected by these policies, and were 
forced to withdraw 7 out of its 12 product brands from the Uruguayan market.  
Subsequently, PMI engaged the Uruguayan government in a six-year legal 
battle, beginning a long-drawn out suit before the World Bank’s International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), in a move which can be 
interpreted as more of an attempt to intimidate other countries than as a 
genuine attempt to win compensation for lost income: the Action on Smoking 
and Health (ASH), the oldest anti-tobacco organisation in the United States, 
said Philip Morris “had accomplished its primary goal… in launching the suit… 
six years and millions of dollars have been spent [by Uruguay] defending a 
non-discriminatory law that was intended purely to protect public health”.16 
Philip Morris International was able to take advantage of the ambiguities of 
the Switzerland-Uruguay BIT to mount a legitimate legal challenge against the 
government of the Republic of Uruguay. The global tobacco group argued that 
the ‘Single Presentation Requirement’, and the 80% regulation, were violating 
the fair and equitable treatment clause of the Swiss-Uruguayan BIT. Philip 
Morris claimed the group ‘never questioned Uruguay’s authority to protect 
public health’17, but there was no evidence that they would lead to a decrease 
in ill-health caused by smoking. Without a legal consensus on the facts of the 
 
15 DeAtley, Bianco,, Welding, Cohen,Compliance with Uruguay’s single presentation requirement. 
16 Casaldi and Eposito, Philip Morris loses tough-on-tobacco lawsuit in Uruguay. 
17 Mander, Uruguay defeats Philip Morris test case lawsuit. 
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policies, Philip Morris suggested the decision was essentially an arbitrary one 
and thus by logical extension an unfair one. Moreover, Philip Morris further 
argued that the 80% legislation did not leave sufficient space on a cigarette 
packet for the intended branding, PMI argued the Uruguayan government had 
essentially expropriated the firm’s Intellectual property rights, specifically its 
trademark branding, thus violating the investment protection agreement 
between Uruguay and Switzerland, signed in 1991.18 Finally, the Switzerl-
Uruguay BIT confirmed that each state should provide a stable regulatory 
environment in which firms are able to trade. Philip Morris argued that these 
arbitrary legislations implemented by Presidential decree were not in keeping 
with the stable regulatory environment clause.   
After six years of legal battles, and over $38 million cumulatively spent on legal 
fees by both parties, a single vote won the case for Uruguay. This does not, 
however, represent a victory for BITs. Philip Morris spent $28 million dollars 
on legal fees but only sued for $25 million worth of damages.19 Additionally, it 
is worth noting PMI’s annual revenues exceed 80 billion dollars (USD) across 
180 countries – far greater than the Constitutional Republic of Uruguay’s 50 
billion-dollar (USD) GDP.20 Philip Morris never sought to use the case to 
genuinely seek compensation for the potential lost income caused by 
Uruguay’s legislation as the case would have lost them millions of dollars either 
way. Instead, this case was used as a means of discouraging other, less wealthy 
nations from enacting anti-smoking legislation – for, despite its victory in the 
courts, the Uruguayan government was forced to pay millions of dollars in legal 
fees. Moreover, that this wasn’t a unanimous decision from the arbitral 
tribunal: a dissenting opinion was expressed by an arbitrator, and that only a 
single vote won the case for Uruguay, both demonstrate the extent to which 
this was an exceptionally close call. It is extremely likely that PMI considered 
this ruling a significant victory in that it may well have deterred other small 
nations from enacting legislation.21 
 
18 Tobacco Tactics: from the University of Bath, Latin America and Carribbean Region 
19 Olivet and Villareall, Who Really Won the Legal Battle Between Phillip Morris and Uruguay?, 
20 Mander, Uruguay defeats Philip Morris test case lawsuit. 
21 Olivet and Villareal, Who Really Won the Legal Battle Between Philip Morris and Uruguay? 
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The Philip Morris v Uruguay (2016) case makes the pitfalls or BITs abundantly 
clear. Philip Morris’ case was only made possible through the ambiguous and 
abstract terms of a BIT. Beyond this, the case was initially considered in a court 
of law in Uruguay but quickly thrown out. Only because of BIT’s insistence 
upon the use of tribunals (in which the claimant appoints one third of the 
arbitrators), which are often biased towards firms did this case become so 
closely fought. Even if Philip Morris did not win the case on a technical level it 
is interesting to note that as of 2020 no other Latin American country, and very 
few other developing nation states, have implemented progressive tobacco 
control policies to the degree as Uruguay, which surely represents a victory for 
PMI. Nonetheless, in 2017, Uruguay’s President Tabre Vasquez announced his 
government would introduce ‘Plain Packaging’ legislation – whereby all 
unique branding material (logos, colours, or promotional text) is removed save 
from text-name alone – joining only 6 other countries to do so – being 
Australia, the United Kingdom, Ireland, France, Norway, and Hungary.22 
The first major criticism of BITs explored in this essay has proved a solid 
foundation for further investigation. There is justification to suggest BITs can 
be weaponised by large firms to attack nation states’ attempts to enact 
regulatory public policy. Crucially, it is not this flaw of BITs which has 
prompted the EU to take action against them, and which thus threatens their 
status as the major means of conducting international trade. Instead, the EU’s 
concern with BITs is more political and revolves around the use of 
international tribunals as dispute resolution mechanisms. The EU’s decision 
to terminate all intra-EU BITs was made following the European Court of 
Justice’s decision on the Slovak Republic v Achmea case (2018).23 In 2006 the 
Slovak government began the process of de-liberalising its health care market 
and in doing so prevented Dutch insurer Achmea – who had only invested in 
the Slovak Republic because of its liberalised healthcare market – from 
distributing the profits it made whilst providing healthcare insurance in 
Slovakia. Following this, Achmea began proceedings against the Slovak 
 
22  Tobacco Tactics: from the University of Bath, Philip Morris vs the Government of Uruguay   
23 International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), EU Member States Sign Agreement to 
Terminate Intra-EU BITs 
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Republic, arguing that the state had violated article 4 of the Dutch-Slovak BIT 
which allows firms the right to the ‘free transfer of profit and dividends’.   
Originally, an international tribunal agreed with the Dutch Insurer that the 
Slovak Republic had violated its BIT and ordered the state to pay €22.1 million 
in compensation.24 The Slovak Republic, however, appealed the decision, not 
by disagreeing with the final judgement, but by challenging the tribunal’s very 
power to make such a judgement, suggesting that the use of an external 
international arbitration tribunal to decide legal matters between two EU 
member states represented a breach of EU law. The European Court of 
Justice’s judgement ‘addressed three key features of the arbitration clause in 
the BIT that made it incompatible with the European Union’s judicial system 
and the autonomy of EU law’: ‘disputes an arbitration tribunal may be called 
to resolve “are liable to relate to the interpretation or application of EU law 
(para.39.)”; investment tribunals were not internationally independent 
alternatives to domestic judiciary systems, but part of them (though not, 
however, part of the judicial system of the Netherlands or Slovakia); and 
finally, awards issued by investment tribunals must be addressed ‘by means of 
a reference for a preliminary ruling’, subject to review by an EU member state 
court.25 From the perspective of the EU – and the European Court of Justice –
BITs are means through which member states can create deals which the EU 
cannot rule on, primarily due to the incorporation of arbitration clauses in BIT 
agreements which necessitate cases be hear, per the New York Convention, 
1958. The ‘Preliminary Reference System’ is thus the solution whereby the ECJ 
operates to preserve the integrity of the application of EU law to cases – in 
member-state judiciaries – where International Investment Law takes 
precedent over EU law. In the case of the Case C-284/16 Achmea/Dutch-
Slovak BIT, the ECJ could not – at the time –  invalidate the proceedings, 
however they could stem the enforcement of awards produced from the 
tribunal at the ICSID. . The European Court of Justice ruled in favour of the 
Slovak Republic. In doing so, the EU essentially declared the intra-EU BIT null 
 
24 Ankersmit, Achmea: The Beginning of the End for ISDS in and with Europe? 
25 Ibid  
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and void, a decision reflected to a greater scale months later when 22 member-
states agreed to the termination of all 196 intra-EU BITs.   
The EU’s position on Intra-EU BITs demonstrates the seriousness of the threat 
they believe BITs pose to judicial superiority over its member states. Indeed, a 
BIT may appear to promote liberal economic policy, but until they are 
regulated by well-established courts, rather than inconsistent and 
unpredictable international tribunals, states may see them as easier to break 
than other forms of trade agreement. It is important to note that BITs are often 
disputed: by 2015, 3,300 BITs had been signed, and 696 disputes surrounding 
BITs had been brought to tribunals (roughly 20% of all BITs are disputed).26 
BITs were developed in the wake of decolonisation and were designed to 
protect developed nations’ investment in countries who had demonstrated 
economic nationalist tendencies, especially in terms of expropriation following 
independence. It is therefore ironic that the very same states (consider 
Germany’s role in the EU and in the founding of BITs) have begun to be 
concerned that BITs are themselves furthering economic nationalist interests. 
BITs are not themselves inherently nationalist instruments, however; rather, 
they are open-ended agreements which can be easily interpreted and utilised 
by economic nationalists. As such, it is true that BITs played a powerful role in 
liberalising the global economy in the 1990s. This was mainly driven by the 
liberalising instincts of the political powers of that era. Now, a resurgence of 
economic nationalism has led to BITs being used for economic nationalist 
purposes. BITs are neither economic nationalist instruments nor vehicles 
through which liberal economic policies can be achieved, but poorly regulated, 
open-ended treaties through which economic actors of all persuasions hope to 







26 Raphael Lencucha, “Is It Time to Say Farewell to the ISDS System” in International Journal of 
Health Policy Management 6, no. 5 (May 2017): 290. 
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